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Karatani Kôjin is one of the most important New Left 
critics active today. Several of his key concepts, such as 
“beyond capital-nation-state” and “singularity,” have not 
only sparked considerable theoretical discussion in the 
academe, but have sometimes become guiding principles of 
social movements both in Japan and abroad. Over the past 
fifteen years, his has been a key standpoint in discussions of 
the nation state in political philosophy. Taiwan’s massive 
“Sunflower Movement” in March of 2014, which to some 
extent related to Karatani, can be interpreted as the re-
problematization of the concept of “East Asia” and 
subjectivity under postmodernity. This essay attempts to  
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characterize the potential, practicality, as well as problems  
in Karatani’s thinking on democracy, through a comparative 
analysis of the recent history of the nation state in Japan and 
China. The starkly different interpretations of the concept 
of modernity in China and Japan complicate a general 
account of East Asian modernity. Japan’s pre-war “East 
Asian imaginary” and the notion of “overcoming 
modernity” also differ sharply from revolutionary China’s 
“anti-modern modernity.” I argue that such a comparison 
shows the strengths and limitations of Karatani’s 
formulations. Moreover, the study of social movement 
must also be modified to account for these divergent 
trajectories. 
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n March of 2014, in the middle of Taiwan’s massive 
“Sunflower Movement” that had erupted in protest 
against the service sector trade agreement (“Cross-Straits 
Service Sector Trade Agreement”) between Taiwan and the 
People’s Republic of China and against the undemocratic 
measures under which it was adopted (the “black box”), a 
I




photograph of one of the student leaders carrying a copy of 
Karatani Kôjin: On Politics spread like wildfire through the 
media. Afterwards, many debates about the movement in 
Taiwan, China, and Japan revolved around Karatani. The 
Sunflower Movement could be considered in the context of 
a range of historical issues and hurts as reflected in critical 
discussions in East Asia over the last few decades, around 
colonialism (Japan and Taiwan), national sovereignty 
(Mainland China and Taiwan), or modernization and war 
(Japan and China). In respect to all of these questions, the 
thought of Karatani has been salient concerning the re-
problematization of the concept of “East Asia” and of 
subjectivity under postmodernity. The present essay is an 
attempt to see what is thereby revealed about various 
problems concerning East Asia’s past and present 
intellectual awareness and social movement.  
II. Modern Japan and the Thought of Karatani 
Modern Japan: Between East Asia and West Europe. Karatani 
Kôjin (1941- ) is one of the best known East Asian critics 
active today. In and outside Japan, his thought is generally 
located along the axis of “postmodern critique” and the “new 
left.” Indeed, he was deeply influenced by modern Western 
philosophical currents, most prominently phenomenology 
and structuralism. His engagement with Marxism and social 
movements inside and outside the academe began with his 
involvement in the protest movement against the ANPO 




Treaty (Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between 
the United States and Japan) in the 1960s. The above 
characterization of his thought is fundamentally correct, yet 
it makes Karatani seem no different from a host of Western 
thinkers. As for the New Left, one could even say that 
within the neo-liberal capitalist systems of the developed 
countries, “critique” would necessitate a return to Marx.1 
Karatani, however, was marginalized in the East Asian 
context, and within Asian leftism. He continued to further 
the legacy of Asian new left movements—which were 
usually accused of “terrorism” and were almost left without 
a voice—and became widely read internationally. In this he 
was distinctive. And his distinctiveness is also the 
distinctiveness of Japan’s concepts of both “new left” and 
“postmodern” or, to take it one step further, the 
distinctiveness of the Japanese “modern.” 
On the question of modernity, Japan indeed has the 
status of “honor student,”2 yet we must note that the term 
implies the belated and derivative character of Japanese  
 
 
1 Louis Althusser (Pour Marx, 1965), Terry Eagleton (Marxism and Literary 
Criticism, 1976), Gilles Deleuze (Mille Plateaux, 1980), Jacques Derrida (Spectres 
de Marx, 1993), and most other thinkers considered under the broad rubric of 
“postmodern theory” respond wittingly or unwittingly to the work of Marx. 
2 A famous ironic notion of Takeuchi Yoshimi. “Japanese culture is thus 
structurally an honor student culture. The bright students gathered in military 
academies and imperial universities, after which they ruled Japan.” Takeuchi 
Yoshimi and Richard Calichman, What Is Modernity (Columbia University Press, 
2005), 67-70.   




modernity. With regard to historical periodization, despite 
the claims of some intellectuals who distinguished the 
modernity of Japan from other Asian countries, 3  Japan’s 
modernization did not resemble Western Europe’s, with its 
geographical discovery and early history of accumulation. 
Rather, the “modern” dropped from the sky in the middle 
of the nineteenth century into a “discovered” Japan. As for 
the intellectual mastery of modernization (or anti-
modernization), it goes without saying that Japan did not go 
through the “process” of debate as occurred in the West 
since the Age of Enlightenment. Rather, the cumulative 
“results” of the debates arrived in Japan at one point, at the 
end of the nineteenth century. The historical and 
geographical dimensions of Western thought were thus 
unavoidably occluded by this temporal compression, and 
what remained were those elements that were suitable to the 
Japanese political sphere. This temporal dimension of 
thought was one reason why the “overcoming modernity” 
debates—a climactic moment in Japan’s critique of 
modernity—could not be assimilated into the general 
critique of modernity. Whether actively or passively, Japan’s 
embrace of modernization was conditional. During the 
nationalist heyday, as even militarism was rearing its head, it 




 Such as Fukuzawa Yukichi pointed out in his famous work "De-
Asianization"(1885).   




Weber. In fact, from the retention of the emperor system  
itself (even if this is merely nominal), one can see that such 
classic elements of Western modernity as the social contract 
or democracy fit uneasily with the Japanese case. 
In the context of an uncompleted modernization, Japan’s 
“new left” and “postmodern” remain ambiguous categories. 
On the one hand, the Japanese new left’s relation to its own 
“old left” was not the same as the Western European left 
trajectory. On the other hand, it was not at all certain that 
post-war Japan, with its rapid economic development, formal 
democracy, and cultural conservatism, could embrace the 
“postmodern” as easily as some thinkers claimed it could.4 In 
certain respects, modern Japan is further removed from Asian 
logic than any other nation or region; yet it is also closely 
bound to this territorial relationship. Beginning with the Pan-
Asianism of Okakura Tenshin, Japan was tireless in its 
construction of discourses on the “East” (東洋 ), “East 
Asia” (東亜 ), or “Greater East Asia” (大東亜 ). In the 
context of Western European and East Asian relations, the 
situation of the “new left” and “postmodern” are but two 
examples of the “in-between” position into which modern 
Japan has been forced. Clearly however, this “in-between”  
 
 
4 In Introduction to the Reading of Hegel: Lectures on the Phenomenology of Spirit 
(1968 edition), Alexandre Kojève, who was completely fascinated by the 
picture of post-war Japan, regarded Japanese lifestyle as another form of post-
history or postmodern. 




status is not a safe space of concord and compromise, but 
an extremely weak and fragile thing. This is the context of 
Karatani’s methodology—“beyond capital-nation-state” and 
the underlying notion of “transcritique.”   
The Scope of the “In-between”: “Transcritique” and the Kyoto 
School. Although Karatani has continued to produce new 
concepts, his most important and most representative 
concept to date has been, in my view, that of “beyond 
capital-nation-state,” which appeared in Transcritique: Kant and 
Marx (2000). This standpoint is not only the summation of 
his earlier work in epistemology, but is also the foundation 
for his later writings on political philosophy and practice, 
where he deploys concepts such as “Mode D” (The Structure of 
World History, 2010), “Isonomia” (The Origin of Philosophy, 
2012), and “Nomadization” (On Nomadization, 2014). This 
standpoint refers to the methodology derived from his 
reading of Kant and Marx, which he refers to as transcritique, 
and it is a method he uses in returning to their work. 
Combining “trans” (transversal/transcendental) and 
“critique” is thus a critical methodology that circulates back 
and forth “between” and continually “critiques” seemingly 
self-evident positions. 
Karatani’s resistance to standpoints and foundations can 
be traced back to continual oscillations within the history of 
criticism since the 1960s—in between phenomenology-
existentialism, and structuralism-poststructuralism. He finds 




that in their divisions there always remains an “outside.”5 
The trajectory of his work can be illustrated by the following 
questions: Is there not a physically embodied Other outside 
Kierkegaard’s “God”? Is there not an Other outside of 
Sartre’s “hell” that can even forestall the emergence of this 
“hell”6? Althusser considers Marx’s theory of money to be 
metaphysical. Is it possible to have an Other beyond what 
appears to be teleological7? Is there not an Other beyond 
Husserl’s life-world? Is there not an Other beyond 
Heidegger’s destiny 8 ? Is there not an Other beyond 
Levinas’s cherished “absolute Other”9? And lastly, as for 
those poststructuralists who seemingly deploy an “outside” 
to deconstruct the history, is there not, beyond the history 
they have emptied out under the rubric of the simulacrum, 
an Other in a continual struggle within history10? Karatani is 
aware that metaphysics is not only confined to traditional 
philosophy—this is common knowledge—but holds that it 
also extends to a number of 20th century schools of 
thought, such as phenomenology, which identified and  
 
 
5 All of the intellectuals—Marx, Kant, et al.—on whom Karatani focused 
were located in his “in-between.” He first paid attention to Sôseki, who, while 
studying in Great Britain, had felt “bullied by British literature” and then began 
his interrogation of Japanese literature.  
6 See Kôjin Karatani, Human in Awe (Tokyo: Tōjūsha, 1972).  
7 See Kôjin Karatani, Marx: The Center of Possibilities (Tokyo: Kōdansha,1978). 
8 See Kôjin Karatani, Philosophical Inquiry 2 (Tokyo: Kōdansha,1989). 
9 See Kôjin Karatani, Creation of NAM (Chiba: Ohta Press, 2001). 
10 See Kôjin Karatani, History and Repetition (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2004). 




attempted to overcome metaphysics, as well as postmodern 
philosophy, which, announcing prematurely that it had 
already done so, proved thereby to be the more dangerous 
tendency. For this reason, only a form of critique that is 
situated “in-between” and directed towards an “outside” can 
avoid the various dangers of metaphysics, and this is what 
he terms “transcritique.” 
It is clear that Karatani’s critical notions of “between” 
and “outside” relate to the politics of difference, an 
emphasis in Western postmodern philosophy. But 
significantly, considering the Japanese context, the emphasis 
on the “in-between” did not originate with Karatani, but 
was a vital component of the discourse of the Kyoto School 
in the mid-20th century. If we consider “betweenness” a 
nightmare permeating all of Japanese modernity, it must be 
recognized that it was the Kyoto School, one of the most 
important currents of modern Japanese thought, that first 
consciously theorized this bodily sensation. Indeed, Kyoto 
School disciples were greatly influenced by German 
phenomenology, and provided a philosophical justification 
for Japan’s war in East Asia, but the thought of the Kyoto 
School cannot simply be subsumed under phenomenology, 
nor can it so easily be ridiculed as an ignorant apologist for 
authoritarianism, as has been the practice of some post-war 
claimants occupying a “higher” moral ground. The Kyoto 
School, considered broadly, did not only include, on the 
ideological spectrum, members of the extreme left and the 




extreme right, but intellectually was located “between” 
phenomenology and structuralism. For example, Tanabe 
Hajime of the Kyoto School held that neither dialectical 
idealism (Hegel) nor dialectical materialism (Marx) were 
absolutes, nor were the “individual” (the independent 
individual subject) and the “genus” (the notion that formed 
its base) absolutes. Between these there must be a “mutually 
negating intermediary,” 11  which he termed an “absolute 
dialectic” and a type of “species.” Tanabe seems quite radical 
in the moment of perceiving that neither side of an apparent 
opposite version of truth was metaphysical. Disregarding its 
political character, Karatani’s “transcritique” is readable in 
precisely this way. Similarly, those familiar with Karatani’s 
work will easily recognize the affinity with Tanabe, who as a 
scholar of Kant emphasized in a very similar way that the 
motion of this negation was not founded in reason but in 
practice, and identified this as Kant’s “purposiveness.”   
Here arises a fraught question: What is the difference, 
ultimately, between Karatani who was defined as a “leftist 
postmodern philosopher,” and Tanabe, considered 
throughout Asia (including Japan) as the representative 
figure of wartime nationalism? Although Karatani has 
critiqued the Kyoto School, and although most research on 
Karatani emphasizes his ties to Marxism, without clarifying  
 
 
11 Hajime Tanabe, Collected Works of Tanabe Hajime 7 (in Japanese) (Tokyo: 
Chikuma Shobô, 1976), 253. 




this connection, questions could arise about “transcritique” 
as well as a number of Karatani’s concepts that seem on the 
surface to be similar to the Kyoto School’s thought. And in 
fact, in recent years there have been doubts of just this kind 
cast on Karatani,12 including within the debates around the 
Sunflower Movement in Taiwan. Of course the two differ 
greatly. But what is it, precisely, that allows Karatani’s 
theories to differentiate themselves from seeming affinities 
with the Kyoto School Thought, and what allows Karatani’s 
thought, in the field of practice, to have revolutionary 
power? Do these vague affinities with Kyoto School 
Thought indicate some limitations in Karatani’s theoretical 
formulation? We can seek the answers to these questions in 
his texts.   
III. “Transcritique” and “Beyond Capital-Nation-State” 
Kant’s Transcritique: The Thing-in-itself and World Citizen. 
Since transcritique is a critique emanating from between two 
opposing positions, Karatani’s initial focus is on the four 
antinomies in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. Karatani held 
that although Kant used a reductio ad absurdum to demonstrate  
 
 
12 Although Chinese critics, in their criticism of Karatani, all bring their 
own ideological background to the critique, there are some Japanese critics on 
the left, such as Koyasu Nobukuni, who think that Karatani courts the danger 
of “imperialism-izing” “Empire.” This is a harsh criticism, which implied 
Karatani’s connection to the Kyoto School. Nobukuni Koyasu, Empire or 
Democracy: The Problem Between China and East Asia (in Japanese) (Tokyo: 
Shakaihyôron-sha, 2015), 75.  




the simultaneous truth of the four antinomies, this did not 
resolve the contradiction between the antinomies, and it was 
due to this non-resolution that the antinomies could both 
stand. For example, on the question of freedom, whether 
one considers the subject as possessing freedom 
(voluntarism) or not (determinism) seems to posit the former 
as subjective and the latter as objective. But in fact, the latter 
is not objective either, otherwise one would not need the 
“actually objective” thing-in-itself. Karatani points out that it 
is only by considering the two aspects of an antinomy as a 
phenomenon to be deconstructed can Kant’s thing-in-itself 
be considered actually objective. Here, Kant’s phenomenon 
and Husserl’s phenomenon are not the same. Husserl’s 
phenomenological bracketing of the scientific world renders 
it forever bracketed, thus the paradox in Section 53 of The 
Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology 13 
does not presume an antinomial tension. In fact, this 
paradox is rapidly dissolved by a presumed human 
subjectivity.14 Karatani’s reading of Kant does not ignore the 
mutual critique implied in Kant’s binary opposition. When 
the subject of “pure reason” is bracketed, the subject is free.  
 
 
13  “How can a component part of the world, its human subjectivity, 
constitute the whole world, namely, constitute it as its intentional formation . . . ?” 
Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An 
Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy, trans. David Carr (Evanston, IL: 
Northwestern University Press, 1970), 179. 
14 Kôjin Karatani, Transcritique: On Kant and Marx (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 
2004), 138. 




When the subject of “pure practice” is bracketed, the subject 
is unfree. So is the subject free or unfree? On this topic, 
Karatani refutes the sort of nonsense that holds that the 
subject’s actions are restricted under certain conditions but 
also possesses certain margins for activity. Transcritique is 
the opposite of compromise. In the realm of practice, the 
constituted subject is inescapably free. Bracketing the unfree 
subject only implies that the subject, knowing that it is not 
free, must also acknowledge Kant’s “categorical imperative,” 
and consider itself free, and thus responsible for its own 
actions. This is what forms the basis of ethics.15  
Karatani holds, however, that an ethical authority getting 
beyond the community must be on the basis of 
“singularity”—the world citizen—as discussed in Kant’s 
Perpetual Peace. This singularity is not simply liberalism’s 
atomized individual, but is rather the subjective space 
discovered by transcritique. Karatani focuses on Kant’s 
subversion of the private domain and the public domain. 
Kant’s private domain is Hegel’s “community” (Elements of 
the Philosophy of Right): a homogenous collective space 
disciplined by individual-centered discourse of feelings, 
aesthetics, morality, and e(S). The genuine public domain, 
according to Kant, is constituted by “world citizens” 
through the rejection of existing communal mediation, and  
 
 
15 Ibid., 179-81. 




in this way freedom of action under universal ethics is a 
possibility.16 Of course, the universalism referred to here is 
not the same as hegemonic generality, which is connected to 
a particularity. Generality and particularity are still within the 
context of community in the broad sense, for the latter 
always serves as a supplement to the former. Karatani’s 
universalism, which presumes a union of singularities as 
“transcritical space,” is something akin to Kant’s 
“transcendental.” This transcendental however, is itself a 
kind of transcritique. It must be emphasized that Kant did 
not consider “transcendental” as “transcendent”; it is “on 
no account ‘higher,’” 17  nor anything transcending 
experience, but merely what made empirical knowledge a 
possibility.   
Marx’s Transcritique: Money and Economic Crisis. An 
antinomy encountered in Marx and in Capital, was that 
between the neo-classical economic position that “surplus 
value does not arise from within the production process” 
 
16 Ibid., 155-56. 
17
 Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, trans. and ed. 
Gary Hatfield, (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 125. In 
Karatani’s deployment of the concept of “transcendental,” his approach after 
his deep encounter with Kant was very different from his earlier work. For 
example, in Marx: The Center of Possibility (1978), Karatani was not very 
concerned with this concept, often conflating it with “transcendence.” It is 
from Philosophical Inquiry 2 (1989) that when he turned to Husserl, he 
differentiated the two notions clearly, and pointed out Husserl’s metaphysical 
misreading of “transcendental.” Karatani’s understanding of transcendence 
was precisely that of Kant’s third definition of “transcendental” in the 
appendix of Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysic, which stressed the difference 
between “transcendental” and “transcendence.”   




and the classical economic position that “surplus value does 
not arise from the realm of circulation.”  Karatani’s 
explanation is that one can, as in Ricardianism, ignoring 
circulation, consider money to be another form of 
commodity and thus something nullifiable by human will, or 
one can, as in Bayley, consider commodities to have no 
value in themselves but only in relation to other 
commodities. Neither of these positions takes into account 
money’s “exterior” or even “spiritual” character. In contrast 
to a particular commodity that can be hoarded without limit, 
money has more power of exchangeability. It is easily 
conserved and can be exchanged at any time or any place for 
other commodities. When one reaches the level of the credit 
system, M (money) does not need to pass through C 
(commodity) in order to become M’ (money plus profit). In 
summary, the ability to solve a crisis of exchange in the 
present by displacing it into the future, cannot be 
accomplished by any commodity but money, and this is 
capital. Marx’s theory of money in Capital (simple value 
form→expanded value form→general value form→money) 
considered in isolation seems to resemble “absolute spirit,” 
but when one considers the difference between Marx and 
earlier economic thinkers, specifically Marx’s position that 
economic crisis is not an exception to capitalism, this 
teleological conception of money vanishes. In other words, 
the development from the general form of value 
(commodity) to money was not a smooth and easy process 




but a manner of facing a real yet uncertain future that needs 
a “leap of death.” Commodities can sometimes become 
money and at other times cannot (death). Paying attention to 
this necessary inability, Marx was able to consider crisis as a 
“cyclical necessity” of capitalism.18   
This suggests that a critical perspective depends on seeing 
capital both from the standpoint of the commodity (selling) 
as well as from the consumer’s standpoint of money 
(buying). Karatani once compared the consumer with 
Wittgenstein’s Other, 19 but his meaning was not the same as 
that of the Frankfurt School idea of a fragmented and 
divided worker/consumer. Quite the opposite, he took the 
standpoint of a consumer for whom money was outside of 
capital, capable of maintaining an otherness and a critical 
space, to take the point further, of a consumer capable of 
causing crisis. Karatani paid particular attention to this 
theory of Marx’s: “the exchange of commodities evolves 
originally not within primitive communities, but on their 
margins, on their borders, the few points where they come 
into contact with other communities.”20 It is precisely within 
these two poles—non-communal, with no common 
grammar or language—that transcritique is possible. 
However, there is neither the necessity nor the possibility of 
 
18 Karatani, Transcritique: On Kant and Marx, 323. 
19 Kôjin Karatani, Philosophical Inquiry 1 (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 1986): 39-40, 
44-45. 
20 Ibid., 315. 




regarding the critical consumer as an unconditioned 
subjectivity. Perhaps it is a temporary subject, but after 
considering this it is again necessary to remove the bracket 
around the capital. Just as Marx in Capital put a bracket 
around human subjectivity, Karatani pays particular 
attention to the threats to capital, especially to those 
elements of capital that differ from those of Marx’s day. 
This was the source of his discovery of the “capital-nation-
state.” 
Capital-Nation-State and Its Beyond. Kant represented the 
beyond of the nation-state, and Marx emphasized the limits 
of capitalism. Reading these together, one arrives at the basis 
of Karatani’s critique of the current “capital-nation-state” 
structure. He points out that the modern nation state 
destroyed the separation between feudal towns (capital), the 
rural community (nation) and absolute royal power (state), in 
order for the discourse of bourgeois freedom (capital), 
fraternity (nation), and equality (state) to bind them together 
again. The classic illustration of this is that a crisis of 
capitalism can be overcome by the kind of nationalist 
mutual aid exemplified by Nazism, or by the statist macro-
economic regulation exemplified by Stalinism. In order not 
to privilege one or the other, they must both be surpassed. 
Karatani’s attempt to go beyond capital, nation and state 
was most fully evident in his leadership work in the NAM 
(New Associationist Movement) around the year 2000. This 
was an “economic ethical civil society movement” 




constituted by the kind of “singularity” formed by a Kantian 
beyond of the nation state and a Marxian beyond of capital, 
with the aim of fashioning a form of life outside of these 
three elements.  
It should be emphasized that although both 
“transcritique” and “New Associationism” seem to contain 
an opportunity of “transcendence,” Karatani consciously 
maintains a distance from this “transcendence.” The word 
he used for this is the common verb koeru (“to go beyond,” 
超える), rather than chôetsu (“to transcend,” 超越) from 
idealism, or chôkoku (“to overcome,” 超克) from intellectual 
history. Although Karatani’s project is a return to Marx and 
Kant, it is a return without nostalgia. His standpoint is from 
within the ruins of metaphysics, and the history of a 20th 
century Marxism which, although it had attempted to 
transcend history, had to a certain extent brought disaster. 
Hence, it is a return that acknowledges that there is no 
possibility of “return.” Recognizing the boundaries and in 
certain respects the impossibility of transcendence, as well as 
attempting to construct an anti-metaphysical form of 
resistance, spell a crucial difference between Karatani’s and 
Tanabe’s methodology. As the previous section emphasizes, 
Karatani does not stop at the “in-between.” His “in-
between” not only leads to but must be exposed to an 
“outside,” which arises from the suspicion of the “in-
between” itself. Transcritique is thus considered merely as a 
mode of critique; critique has its limitation, and subject at 




any time to critique. But this is a source of its power. 
Tanabe’s use of “intermediary,” however, although aware of 
the existence of binary opposition, in the end pointed 
towards a “unity” of opposites. But within an “unlimited” 
unity, within an individual/genus structure with no 
“outside,” the intermediary loses the capacity for negation 
that Tanabe had previously emphasized as a necessity. This 
is one reason why, while existing “between” the individual 
and the nation state, Karatani led a civil society movement 
against the nation state, whereas Tanabe’s theory led to a 
war between nation states. Where transcritique implies 
global citizenship, the intermediary in the end is but a bridge 
(unity) between the base and the subject, legitimating the 
individual within the nation-state.21   
This legitimation is not as thoughtless as its consequences 
suggest, however.  Since the first principle of Kyoto School’s 
construction of “Greater East Asia” was an overcoming of 
Western modernity, they were greatly attentive to non-
equivalence between nations and individuals, the difficult task  
 
 
21  Tanabe’s point here is somewhat complex. His “genus” indicates 
something referred to as “the nation of the human race,” something beyond 
contemporary concepts of individual or nation, but, given the limitations of 
contemporary discourse, something only realizable in a specific nation. The 
consequences of this are clearly revealed in Kôsaka Masaaki, another Kyoto 
School scholar’s critique of Tanabe: “Just ‘species’ cannot arrive at 
subjectivity . . . . Only in inter-national relations can subjectivity or autonomy 
exist, and isn’t war by far the best way to raise the national conscience?” 
Masaaki Kôsaka, Historical World (in Japanese) (Kyoto: Tôei-sha, 2002), 231. 




of uniting state and individual, and other elements that were 
implicit in Western discourses of civil society and democratic 
policy. For that reason they proposed a discourse of the 
“clan” (a filial ethical model), proposing that the relationship 
between the family member and the family could be a model 
for the relationships between the citizens of each Asian 
nation and state. Another Kyoto School scholar, Iwao 
Kôyama, defined the clan in a manner that seemed as radical 
as Tanabe’s theories: “(Although a clan member), each 
member must have an independent character. The complexity 
and richness of the clan have a depth that cannot be 
encapsulated by either individualism or authoritarianism.”22 
Despite superficial similarities, Kôyama’s notion of the clan, a 
transcendent, metaphysical version of relationship between 
the nation and the individual, is nothing like Karatani’s “new 
associationism.” The Kyoto School’s clan identity had not 
transcended anything; it was really nothing more than a 
“citizen” changed in form but not essence, and in the end 
proved to be a soldier prepared at any time to sacrifice 
himself for militarism. Karatani continually emphasized the 
limitations of the “singularity” and the “new association.” 
For him, they could never arrive at communism, but rather 
constituted slow progress toward that idea. However,  
considered in retrospect, the metaphor of clan at least serves  
 
 
22 Iwao Kôyama, The World-Historic Viewpoint and Japan (in Japanese) (Tokyo: 
Chûôkôron-sha, 1943), 235.  




as a lesson: appeals to East Asia, the East, the nation, the 
feeling and emotion offer no way out. Karatani’s rapid turn 
to a political philosophical vision of “singularity,” from my 
point of view, naturally owed something to the 1960s, but 
owed even more to Japan’s intellectual history, including the 
Kyoto School and old-school Marxists,23 which led him to 
conclude that aesthetics cannot exceed common sense, 
geographically situated morality cannot resolve universal 
contradictions, and that in no existing communities—nation, 
family, etc.—is there any freedom.   
IV. Enlightenment and Social Movement   
The Debates on “the Sunflower Movement.” From the above it 
is easy to understand Karatani’s turn in recent years toward 
social movements. Moreover, since transcritique is not 
limited to a particular space and must always be “in 
motion,” it is of course always better to take to the streets 
than to sit in one’s study. The Sunflower Student 
Movement, which began on March 18, 2014, was a 
significant outbreak of student-civil society protest, whether 
considered in the East Asian or global contexts. The 
movement arose in reaction to the “Cross-Strait Service 
Trade Agreement” negotiated between the Taiwan 
authorities and Mainland China, which was opposed for the  
 
 
23 See Kôjin Karatani and Hasumi Shigehiko, Ethics of Struggle (in Japanese) 
(Tokyo: Kawade Shobô Shinsha, 1988), 222. 




hegemonic nature of its provisions, which were perceived as 
a thread to the Taiwanese native economy, and also for the 
non-transparency of the legislative process. The protesting 
students, on the day after the legislation was announced, 
occupied the Legislative Yuan assembly hall. From that date 
until the dispersal on April 10, the student movement 
acquired massive support from Taiwanese citizens, whose 
numbers, outside the Legislative assembly hall, reached 
500,000. Support was also forthcoming from labor unions 
and workers’ organizations, and the movement was 
extensively reported by international media. 
Intellectuals in Mainland China and Taiwan were naturally 
attentive to the movement, but due to Japanese intellectuals’ 
imbrication in Chinese-Taiwanese relations, as described 
above, they were drawn into the dialogue as well. Although 
it would be an exaggeration to claim, as certain elements of 
the media did, that Karatani was the ideological stimulus 
behind Taiwan’s Sunflower Movement, 24  the movement 
nevertheless shows traces of Karatani’s thinking. The 
principal members of the movement were economically 
weak young students. Their political platform was anti- 
 
 
24 Wang Dan, one of the June Fourth Movement student leaders, paid 
attention to the Sunflower Movement, and sent Karatani’s works to the 
student leaders. She refuted rumors in the media that Karatani had been 
involved with the movement since the beginning. Karatani’s Taiwanese 
translator, Lin Huijun, felt that Karatani’s thought had indeed inspired the 
movement, but that it was not anything like a “movement manual.”   




neoliberal, anti-hegemonic, and anti-unilateralism. Their 
protest methods were based on non-violent occupation, 
assembly, and demonstrations. Afterwards, in September of 
2014, Karatani participated in a colloquium in Tokyo on the 
Sunflower Movement and gave a talk.  
A series of debates ensued on the legitimacy of the 
movement. Those opposed to the movement charged that 
the movement members had a naïve nationalism and used 
Western leftist theory without any admission or recognition 
of “Chinese experience.”  Supporters of the movement 
emphasized students’ “taking democracy into the Legislative 
Assembly” 25  in order to get beyond China’s neo-liberal 
market and universalized trans-national capital logic. The 
most symptomatic voice, in my view, came from Zhao 
Gang, a Taiwanese intellectual. Zhao Gang’s pro-
democracy, anti-nationalism, and anti-globalization stances 
are similar in fundamental ways to Karatani’s, yet he was 
intensely critical of the Sunflower Movement.   
The essence of Zhao Gang’s critique26 is that behind the 
Sunflower Movement lies “Taiwanese ideology.” In his 
understanding, although there is no proof that the 
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 Zhao Gang, “Taiwan in Storm: Observation and Reflection on Sunflower 
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Democratic Progressive Party, the movement was still 
suspect. For example, although the Sunflower Movement 
advocated “democracy,” its notion of the “citizen” reflected 
neither liberalism’s notion of procedural justice, nor 
Karatani’s desired singularity or world citizenship, but was 
rather a movement seemingly armed by progressive left 
knowledge, but which in fact had within it a something like 
Hegel’s incantations against and fear of a backward China 
(or elsewhere in East Asia outside of Japan), and anxiety 
over the consolidation of Taiwan’s cultural subjectivity. In 
other words, this kind of “citizen” was a community 
contained within the logic of a particular nation state’s 
history, and thus a common type of “particular” community, 
without any possibility for genuine universality. Excluded by 
the Sunflower Movement, according to Zhao Gang, were 
not only the Taiwan Independence advocates unashamed of 
their nationalism, but also the unificationists who identified 
with Mainland China’s history, not to mention those whom 
political leftists should least neglect, such as migrants and 
migrant workers.   
Zhao Gang’s critique was widely shared in Mainland China 
and in Japan.27 Lest one assume that the position of these  
 
 
27 See Zheng Fu and Jing Li, China as Methods? Or Taiwan as Methods? (in 
Chinese), accessed June 30, 2015, http://www.wyzxwk.com/Article/sichao/ 
2015/06/346820.html; Tetsushi Marukawa, “Observations on the Historical 
and Economic Conditions behind the Taiwanese Sunflower Movement: 
Internal and External Factors that Led to the Anti-Service Sector Trade 
Agreement” (in Japanese), Social Movement no. 415 (November 2014): 26-31. 




intellectuals who self-identify with the left is critical of all 
mass movements, matters are more complicated. For 
example, Zhao Gang identifies in Taiwan society a “2008 
watershed.” Before this period, there were various social 
movements with a class basis, and he approves of them. But 
he feels that from the late 2000s, and particularly in the 
Sunflower Movement, the class orientation has transformed 
into a more nationalist character, and for this reason is both 
infantile and uninteresting. On the question of what is to be 
done in the face of ideology of nationalism, in another 
essay 28  Zhao Gang points out that intellectuals and 
academics have an inescapable responsibility to intellectual 
discourse on the island’s future. In an earlier piece29 he put it 
more concisely: do your history homework.  
We will leave aside for the moment the question of 
whether this 2008 watershed exists or not. But it is 
important to note that, although Zhao Gang’s “historical” 
comparison seems to be objective, his claim that society as a 
whole, assumed to operate under a neoliberal social 
framework, has become more and more politically incorrect, 
and that social movements have thus become more and 
more mistaken, can also be read as a recurrence of an old 
form of elite intellectual condescension. It is difficult to say 
 
28 Zhao Gang, “Thought and Movement” (in traditional Chinese), accessed 
March 26, 2014, http://wen.org.cn/modules/article/view.article.php/c8/4057/. 
29 Zhao Gang, Anchor of Knowledge (in Chinese) (Guilin: Guangxi Normal 
University Press, 2005), 203. 




that critics’ standards of enlightenment or rationality are 
simply wrong, but clearly there are many indistinct and 
unformed points. Indeed, in a depoliticized discourse it is 
difficult to create a politicized subject like “singularity” out 
of thin air, but how should one go about the re-
politicization of the subject? With regard to movement 
members who may be unaware of their own nationalism or 
elitism, how can one guarantee that the effort to educate or 
morally motivate them does not itself reveal an elitist, 
nationalist, or ethnocentric logic? Can correct knowledge 
and democracy be taught? It is, however, quite an odd 
spectacle when professors say to students, “Throw down 
your books and take to the streets!”   
From Whence Comes Karatani’s Insistence on Social Movements? 
What I would call the symptomatic character of Zhao Gang’s 
and similar analyses is that they all proceed from a 
dichotomization between intellectual enlightenment and 
social movements, a polarization that has long bedeviled 
contemporary leftist intellectuals. They are unable to casually 
dismiss the democratic logic behind the social movements, 
and yet the movement participants are not the “people” had 
desired for, nor did the actual movements embody the 
“thought” that they thought so necessary. On this question, 
Karatani’s position was very different. His pronouncements30  
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made no mention of Chinese-Taiwanese history, and he 
seemed to think that this was not worthy of much 
discussion. This was not at all due to his ignorance of the 
Chinese revolutionary experience or of Taiwanese ideology, 
nor did it imply that, from an activist or presentist position, 
he chose radical activism over discreet thought. Behind his 
seeming refusal of the “objective historical perspective” was 
a series of questions: What is thought? What is practice? What is 
history? What is the present? Are these relationships always 
contradictory or dialectically unified, and thus unsusceptible to renewed 
analysis?   
To answer this question first regarding the basis of 
Karatani’s insistence on social movements: in my view, 
Karatani’s reformation of this dichotomous structure is 
embodied in the transcritical social movements and in the 
subjectivities of the movements’ participants. It must be 
noted that within the social movements, Marxists’ advocacy 
of communism is nothing new, but Karatani’s emphasis on 
“possible communism” is. The subjectivity question is also 
quite clichéd, but Karatani advocates “transcendental 
subjectivity X”: “There is an identical ego, and there is no 
identical ego.”31    
Concretely speaking, the political-economic practice of 
“possible communism” is based on his detailed examination  
 
 
31 Karatani, Transcritique: On Kant and Marx, 81. 




of history, which he seemingly slights. In politics, since there 
was no successful version of overthrowing the power and 
succeeding in establishing a “non-power,” his idea was that 
the power must continue to exist, but there ought to be a 
way for all those powers that normally constitute a center—
bureaucracy, party, elite, vanguard, etc.—to not consolidate 
themselves, thereby achieving “de-authority.” Likewise, in 
economics, “labor-currency” based directly on labor time 
has proved to be an impossibility, proving the necessity for 
the existence of money, but there ought to be a way, to the 
greatest extent possible, to prevent money from becoming 
capital, and by means of not buying the products of 
industrial capitalism, to allow money based on exploitative 
capitalism to be “de-monified.” Perhaps, within the current 
neoliberal economic order, it is only possible to achieve in 
practice an Associationist way of life. And perhaps the 
subject capable of actualizing this way of life are those 
masses who, by the standards of perfect political correctness 
according to the elite intellectuals, are insufficiently 
politically correct.  
It must be emphasized that this “mass” or “practice” 
dimension does not imply a lack of politics. In Karatani’s 
view, the political correctness or re-politicization sought 
by Zhao Gang and like-minded intellectuals does not 
depend on education, enlightenment, or the motivation or 
moral leadership of an intellectual vanguard, but is more 




like the “thing-in-itself,” existing in the “unconscious”32 of 
the movement participants. Thus, it is wrong to censure the 
movement due to the purported ignorance of the participants, 
or their “reactionary” ideological background. In the case of 
the Sunflower Movement, Taiwan’s ideology consciousness 
or some other form of identical ego always exists. Unrealistic 
utopic impulse also exists, but still, one can neither deny the 
otherness that accompanied transnational capitalism’s 
violence, nor slight the organizational innovativeness of the 
student movement, nor deny that in the end the movement 
actually shifted the political field in Taiwan (even Zhao Gang 
granted this fact33). Karatani holds, in the Japanese context, 
that the opposition of most Japanese people to war and their 
support for Article Nine of the Japanese constitution 
(perpetual demilitarization), is not due to their knowledge of 
“subjectivity,” nor to their identification with a Kantian 
“perpetual peace.” But rather, even if they explicitly advocate 
as nationalists, still they tend toward subjective formation or 
the quest for perpetual peace in a transcendental form, as  
 
 
32 When this kind of concept was first raised, Karatani’s words were not 
“unconscious” but “unconscious of later Freud” or “superego” or “non-
conscious.” He tried to distinguish his own concept from Freudianism in 
essays such as “Nationalism and Death: Kant and Freud.” See Kôjin Karatani, 
Nation and Aesthetics (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2004), 61-125. But from about 
2010, perhaps in order to avoid obscurity and complexity he began to use the 
term “unconscious.”   
33 Zhao Gang, “The Poverty of Thought: A Critique of Long Yingtai’s 
Critique of the Sunflower Movement,” accessed April 7, 2014, 
http://wen.org.cn/modules/article/view.article.php/c12/4073.  




world citizenship. When Karatani, on top of a shabby van in 
Shinjuku, casts aside philosophical vocabulary and concepts, 
and exhorts the crowd to “Go Demonstrate!”, in his view, 
no matter the age, sex, class, or educational level of the 
participants, no matter what they “really think,” in this 
instant when they gather and constitute a space, they have 
already through something like Freud’s notion of “repetition 
compulsion,” constituted themselves as singularities. 
V. Conclusion 
Karatani is sometimes accused, in a manner similar to 
critiques of Hardt and Negri’s “Multitude,” of placing too 
high hopes in social movements. His ethical system is indeed 
a dangerous wager, behind which stands 20th century’s 
unfinished revolutions, and their failed attempts at 
reformation of subjectivity. Indeed, those in social 
movements, or the great majority of those who constitute 
society, although they are not from the intellectual elite, 
perhaps for that reason are not wrong about fundamental 
questions of right and wrong, such as the anti-war or anti-
nuclear cause.   
But it remains to be seen whether it is valid to consider 
these limited subjectivities as latent “singularity,” or go too 
far toward “unconscious” + “practice.”  There is a common 
critique of Karatani, including his comments on the 
Sunflower Movement, which holds his transcendental views 
on social movements to be dangerous, since he seems to 




hold that all activism is justicial. Of course this is incorrect. 
Transcendental means neither transcendent, as mentioned 
above, nor a priori. In other words, his theories are the 
inductive products of one type of social movement, and 
cannot be considered the motivation for all social 
movements. Just as an insufficient conceptual basis does not 
necessarily lead to a bad social movement, it is only 
intellectual arrogance that would hold that a perfected 
conceptual basis would deduce a positive social movement. 
This is the opposite of Karatani’s intention. But even 
though this sort of criticism is a logical error, there is a 
contradiction between Karatani’s call to “go wherever the 
movement is”34 and his own care in choosing which social 
movements to identify with, and perhaps this split exposes 
how the world citizenship or the social movement has 
encountered its “outside.” 
Still, in today’s world, especially in East Asia, an over-
idealization of intellectual and historical debates is probably 
more of a problem than an over-idealization of social 
movements. Obscure concepts such as Karatani’s “possible 
communism” or “transcendental subjectivity X” 
fundamentally serve to indicate epistemological limits. To 
put it in another way, is the relationship between 
enlightened thinking and social movements simply one of  
 
 
34 Kôjin Karatani, Politics and Thought: 1960-2011 (Heibonsha, 2012), 174. 




determinism or of hierarchy? Are social movements simply 
the outward manifestations of thought, destined to be 
subsumed by its teleological consequences? Do not social 
movements, considered as practice, manifest contingent and 
latent elements in excess of thought or language?  
In the debates over the Sunflower Movement, although 
most of its critics tried to be fair, for the most part they still 
felt the need to judge the worth of the movement. But can 
the movement’s real worth, either at that time and place or 
in a more distant future—which might be something 
enduring yet invisible or some small seed sown for the 
future—really be evaluated and judged by theories and logic, 
confident of their predictive judgment? This should no 
longer be a question in these “postmodern” times. 
Unfortunately, many critics, although fluent in postmodern 
theory, whether they oppose or support it, when 
encountering real questions such as this, resort to a kind of 
intellectual determinism. For this reason, I disagree with the 
position that because there are many questions about 
China’s recent history that remain obscure, China therefore 
does not possess the conditions for social movements that 
exist in developed capitalist countries such as the West and 
Japan. This is to epistemologize social movements, and to 
hold that practice has its proper position in a developmental 
logical chain. Social movements should not be categorized in 
this way. Of course China has its specific characteristics, but, 
especially as China more and more resembles developed 




countries in its degree of alienation, to insist on sufficiently 
enlightened knowledge, or on the correct view of history, or 
on the sufficiently correct form of subjectivity as a 
prerequisite for social movement participation is, I am 
afraid, to evade responsibility for present conditions.   
Meanwhile, it is also important not to absolutize the value 
of actual social movements. Social movements constitute a 
marvelous and exceptional space-time.  Participants, free 
from consideration of school, work, home, and all that is 
linked with authority or private property, are indeed able to 
approach a liberated and free subjectivity. But when the 
social movement ends, daily life recommences. There 
remains a wide chasm between social movements that arise 
at a “limit situation” and daily life. To make “disaster 
utopias” possible in normal conditions—if indeed it is 
possible—would entail a long process. Moreover, how can 
one make this revolutionizing of experience something that 
the social movement participant can use in facing the future, 
rather as an object of sentimental nostalgia in later years? To 
accomplish this, knowledge, critique, and the work of 
historicization are sometimes necessary. Karatani 
simultaneously promotes social movements and does not 
neglect the role played by consciousness. In this postmodern 
era of “everything goes” and “nothing actually matters,” 
what is the position of subjectivity? How can practice attain 
to an “outside”? Karatani and the Sunflower Movement 
both provide some inspiration. 
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